Abstract
Are simpler explanations better, all else equal? Many people seem to think so. And many capitalize on this preference by claiming that their explanations are simple—perhaps the simplest! But some scholars have argued that the case for simplicity’s status as a theoretical virtue is quite thin. And some psychological studies raise questions about the reliability of simplicity’s benefits. Alas, once acquired, status as a theoretical virtue is rarely lost. To advance the debate, we conducted three experiments that test another way so-called theoretical virtues may impact reasoning (N = 1312). Merely labeling diagnoses “the simplest explanation” made them more alluring in ways that were not warranted by relevant base rates, symptoms, or other causal information (experiment 1)—even when those diagnoses were not actually the simplest! Neither the opposite label (“most complex”) nor an alternative explanatory virtue label (“most unifying”) had such consistent or reliable effects (experiment 2), suggesting simplicity itself is particularly seductive. The good news is that judgments and decisions were mostly unaffected by fallacious appeals to simplicity when we switched to other contexts and measures (experiment 3). That limited generalization suggests a variety of testable hypotheses about the boundaries and moderators of simplicity’s allure. For example, perhaps people rely more on intuitions about simplicity when diagnostic decision-making would otherwise require effortful reflection on technical terminology and difficult-to-compute probabilities. Together, our findings replicate and extend prior research on simplicity preferences, complement recent arguments and evidence about the risk of considering simplicity, and increase suspicion about simplicity’s virtuous status.