Separating desire from prediction of outcome value

Published on August 4, 2023

Imagine going to a restaurant and ordering a dish that you remember as being disgusting. Now imagine looking forward to eating it, even though you know it will taste awful. That’s the power of desire separating from predictions of outcome value! This phenomenon occurs because our brain has separate rules for desire and prediction. Even though our memories and learned predictions tell us that something is unpleasant or painful, we can still find ourselves wanting it. This can have both adaptive and maladaptive consequences, leading to addictions or cravings for things that we know won’t bring us joy. To understand this further, researchers have presented two examples: ‘wanting what is remembered to be disgusting’ and ‘wanting what is predicted to hurt’. These examples demonstrate how desire can defy our expectations. If you’re intrigued by the intricacies of desire and outcome value, delve into the fascinating research behind it!

Individuals typically want what they expect to like, often based on memories of previous positive experiences. However, in some situations desire can decouple completely from memories and from learned predictions of outcome value. The potential for desire to separate from prediction arises from independent operating rules that control motivational incentive salience. Incentive salience, or ‘wanting’, is a type of mesolimbic desire that evolved for adaptive goals, but can also generate maladaptive addictions. Two proof-of-principle examples are presented here to show how motivational ‘wanting’ can soar above memory-based predictions of outcome value: (i) ‘wanting what is remembered to be disgusting’, and (ii) ‘wanting what is predicted to hurt’. Consequently, even outcomes remembered and predicted to be negatively aversive can become positively ‘wanted’. Similarly, in human addictions, people may experience powerful cue-triggered cravings for outcomes that are not predicted to be enjoyable.

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