Are Our Notions of Identity Set in Stone?

Published on May 19, 2023

Imagine thinking that a person’s identity is as unchangeable as the shape of a mountain. Well, according to this research, that might not be the case. The study delves into the concept of identity essentialism, which suggests that people have a tendency to view categories or kinds as having unalterable core characteristics. However, the findings challenge this notion by revealing that essentialist intuitions about identity vary across cultures and demographics, and can even be influenced by external factors. In other words, our perceptions of identity are more akin to a batch of Play-Doh than the solid rock we imagined. These insights shed light on the malleability of human cognition and how our beliefs about identity can evolve. So if you’re curious about how our notions of identity hold up under different circumstances, don’t hesitate to delve into the intriguing details of this study!

Abstract
The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal
= 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions—the “discovery” and “transformation” scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed.

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