Sun and Firestone [1] argue that the Dark Room Problem poses an important challenge to the ambitions of predictive processing (PP) accounts; specifically, they worry that a standard response threatens the story with triviality, asserting merely that prediction-driven agents avoid dark, food-free corners because they ‘predict that they will not stay in them’. Read Full […]

Sun and Firestone [1] presented a challenge to predictive processing (PP) accounts of brain function by reviving the Dark Room problem – the idea that if agents are mandated to minimise prediction error, the best thing for them to do is to seek out highly predictable environments where nothing changes, and stay there. They argued […]

Abstract The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic […]