Abstract
The finding that people tend to prefer logically valid conclusions over invalid ones is known in the literature as the logic-liking effect and has traditionally been interpreted as evidence for the notion of so-called logical intuitions. Results of more recent empirical studies investigating conditional and categorical syllogisms suggest, however, that previous instances of the logic-liking effect can be accounted for by a confound in terms of surface-feature atmosphere. But the true nature of this atmosphere effect has so far remained largely elusive. Here, we address this issue and introduce two variants of disjunctive syllogisms that enable us to deconfound validity, possibility of the conclusion, and surface-feature atmosphere, which has been impossible with simple disjunctive syllogisms used in earlier studies. Three experiments, in which participants were asked to provide liking and logic ratings for these arguments, revealed that the logic-liking effect in disjunctive syllogisms can be explained by an atmosphere confound in combination with implied demand to consider logicality when judging likability. We also observed a strong atmosphere effect in logic ratings over and above an effect of logical validity per se. Furthermore, atmosphere effects appear to be induced only by specific surface features, namely those that are ecologically valid, if fallible, predictors for logicality. We conclude that acquired atmosphere heuristics provide proxies for logical validity that reasoners often take at face value. A comparison of the present results with previous findings from experiments that focused on conditional and categorical syllogisms additionally indicates that these atmosphere heuristics are used irrespective of an argument’s complexity.

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