Double Prevention, Causal Judgments, and Counterfactuals

Published on April 30, 2022

Imagine a scenario where Mike accidentally knocks a bottle, and just as Jack tries to catch it, Peter accidentally bumps into Jack and causes him to miss. As a result, the bottle falls and spills its contents. Curiously, most people tend to believe that Mike’s initial knock caused the spill, whereas Peter’s accidental bump had no effect. This discrepancy in causal judgments poses a perplexing challenge for theories of counterfactual causation, as both events played a role in the outcome. In a series of experiments, researchers examined this phenomenon and found that differences in people’s counterfactual thinking can account for their causal judgments. By analyzing various counterfactual models of causal judgment, they were able to shed light on these patterns. These findings provide valuable insights into the interaction between counterfactual reasoning and causal cognition. To delve deeper into this fascinating research, check out the full article!

Abstract
Mike accidentally knocked against a bottle. Seeing that the bottle was about to fall, Jack was just about to catch it when Peter accidentally knocked against him, making Jack unable to catch it. Jack did not grab the bottle, and it fell to the ground and spilled. In double-prevention cases like these, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike tend to judge that Mike knocking into the bottle caused the beer to spill and that Peter knocking into Jack did not cause the beer to spill. This difference in causal judgment is a difficult puzzle for counterfactual theories of causal judgment; if each event had not happened, the outcome would not have, yet there is a difference in people’s causal judgments. In four experiments and three supplemental experiments, we confirm this difference in causal judgments. We also show that differences in people’s counterfactual thinking can explain this difference in their causal judgments and that recent counterfactual models of causal judgment can account for these patterns. We discuss these results in relation to work on counterfactual thinking and causal modeling.

Read Full Article (External Site)

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes:

<a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <s> <strike> <strong>