Advancing Gaze-Based Research on Primate Theory of Mind

Published on August 26, 2020

In Horschler et al. [1], we reviewed three new anticipatory looking (AL) studies of false belief (FB) representation in non-human primates (hereafter primates) [2–4] in relation to similar studies in humans [5]. We concluded that AL evidence of belief representation in primates should be interpreted cautiously due to challenges shared with the human literature, as well as a large body of work previously suggesting that primates do not represent others’ beliefs. In response, Kano, Call, and Krupenye [6] argue that comparative AL studies have been more replicable in primates than in humans, that resolving discrepant findings between AL and violation of expectation (VoE) paradigms should be prioritized, and that issues related to ecological validity may partially explain the lack of evidence for belief representation in previous comparative work.

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